

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 USUN N 03678 152217Z

61

ACTION SS-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 3678

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UNSC JA KS VN VS US

SUBJ: CRITIQUE OF JAPAN'S ROLE IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER-  
SHIP DEBATE

REF: (A) SEOUL 6242(NOTAL)

(B) USUN 3539(NOTAL)

(C) USUN 3484(NOTAL)

1. DURING THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) CONSULTATIONS AND DEBATE ON MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA(ORK), NORTH VIETNAM AND SOUTH VIETNAM, USUN MAINTAINED FREQUENT CONTACT WITH JAPAN'S MISSION AND THE ROK OBSERVER OFFICE.

2. WE BRIEFED THE ROK REPRESENTATIVES THAT THEIR APPLICATION FACED STIFF OPPOSITION AND URGED THEM TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT AND SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT, SAITO. THEY WERE IN TOUCH WITH BOTH. STRESSING THE "COMPLEXITY" AND "DELICACIES" OF THE MATTER, AMBASSADOR SAITO GAVE ROK AMBASSADOR PARK LITTLE HOPE THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE DEADLOCK IN THE COUNCIL. AMBASSADOR PARK REPORTEDLY HAD SOME DIFFICULTY IN MEETING SAITO DUE TO THE LATTER'S HEAVY SCHEDULE OF SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS.

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PAGE 02 USUN N 03678 152217Z

3. WE REPORTED ON AUGUST 4(REF B) THAT THE JAPANESE

APPEARED TO HAVE LITTLE HEART IN SUPPORTING THE ROK APPLICATION AND IN STRIVING FOR DEADLOCK; AND ADDITIONALLY THAT SAITO HARDLY GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF AN ENVOY INSTRUCTED TO SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES. FOR INSTANCE, WE COUNSELLED HIS MISSION AGAINST CALLING PREMATURE PLENARY CONSULTATIONS OF THE UNSC BUT HE SCHEDULED PLENARY CONSULTATIONS ON AUGUST 5. WE ALSO RECOMMENDED IN CONNECTION WITH ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA, THAT HE FOLLOW STANDARD PROCEDURAL LINES AND PROPOSE ITS ADOPTION AS A WHOLE. HAD THERE BEEN OPPOSITION IN THE COUNCIL TO THIS PROPOSAL, HE COULD HAVE FORCED PROCEDURAL VOTE WHICH WOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE OTHER SIDE TO MARSHAL 9 VOTES TO OBTAIN A SEPARATE VOTE ON THE KOREAN APPLICATION. WE SUSPECT THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PRODUCE ONLY 8 VOTES. THIS MIGHT HAVE RESULTED IN DEADLOCK. INSTEAD SAITO, RESPONDING IN PARTICULAR TO THE STATED WISHES OF THE COMMUNISTS AND THE NON-ALIGNED DURING THE PLENARY CONSULTATIONS, BEGAN THE AUGUST 6 SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING BY PROPOSING A VOTE ON EACH ITEM OF THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA. AS A RESULT, THE AGENDA ITEM ON SOUTH KOREA'S APPLICATION WAS DROPPED EARLY ON BECAUSE IT GOT ONLY THE PREDICTABLE SEVEN APPROVING VOTES.

4. PROCEDURAL MANEUVERING COULD WELL IN ANY EVENT HAVE RESULTED IN THE EVENTUAL REMOVAL OF SOUTH KOREA EVEN IF SAITO HAD FOLLOWED OUR RECOMMENDATIONS, HOWEVER, SAITO DID NOT USE THE LATITUDE OF HIS OFFICE TO MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES OF PRODUCING A PROCEDURAL DEADLOCK WHICH WOULD HAVE AVOIDED ANY APPLICANT BEING INSCRIBED. THERE WERE DEVICES AVAILABLE TO HIM WHERE HE COULD HAVE TRIED TO PUT THE BURDEN ON CHINA. TO MARSHALL 9 VOTES TO DELETE KOREA, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SAITO'S RULINGS CONFORMED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE ADVICE OF THE UN SECRETARIAT.

5. PRESUMABLY UNDER INSTRUCTION, SAITO STEERED A COURSE RESPONSIVE TO JAPAN'S OVERALL INTERESTS. HE ACCOMMODATED THE NON-ALIGNED AND THE COMMUNISTS BY SUPPORTING THEIR INSISTANCE (AND THE RECOMMENDATION OF SOME OF THE SECRETARIAT), THAT THE THREE APPLICATIONS BE TREATED AS INDIVIDUAL AGENDA ITEMS. THEN, IN A RELATIVELY BELATED GESTURE WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSED HIM SOME PERSONAL EMBARRASSMENT OWING TO THE WRANGLE IT CAUSED IN THE COUNCIL CHAMBER, CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 USUN N 03678 152217Z

HE STOOD FIRMLY BY HIS GUNS THAT THE AGENDA (WITH THE ROK ITEM DELETED) BE PUT TO A VOTE AS A WHOLE. BY SO DOING, SAITO CONFORMED WITH OUR STRONG RECOMMENDATION TO HIM. FINALLY, ON AUGUST 11, IN EXPLANATION OF JAPAN'S AFFIRMATIVE VOTES ON THEIR APPLICATIONS, SAITO SAID: "JAPAN, AS AN ASIAN NATION, ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ADMISSION OF THE TWO VIETNAMS TO THE UNITED NATIONS".

6. IN SUM, WHILE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SAITO REASONABLY  
COULD HAVE DELAYED FURTHER THE PROCESS OF SECURITY COUNCIL  
CONSIDERATION OF THE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS, WE CANNOT GIVE  
HIM HIGH MARKS FOR HIS MANAGEMENT OF THE UNSC DURING THIS  
DEBATE. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, SEE ALL THAT MUCH JUSTIFICATION  
FOR OR UTILITY IN CRITICIZING HIM TOO HARSHLY IN ANY  
DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL. WE CAN ADD THAT ON JULY 29 JAPAN'S  
MINISTER OHTAKA APPROACHED US TO RE-EMPHASIZE, AS HE HAD  
DONE IN JUNE, THAT JAPAN WAS MUCH UPSET WHEN IT WAS NOT  
BROUGHT INTO INITIAL PLANNING FOR 1975 DRAFT RESOLUTION ON  
KOREA. OHTAKA ADDED THAT JAPAN WOULD BE GREATLY PUT OUT  
IF NOT CUT IN EARLY ON MOVES IN CONNECTION WITH AN ROK  
MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION (REF C). THUS, THE UNSC DEBATE  
MAY HAVE REFLECTED AN ELEMENT OF RESENTMENT THAT JAPAN WAS  
CONSULTED LATER RATHER THAN EARLIER ON THE ROK'S REACTIVA-  
TION OF ITS MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION.  
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